Tribal militia or clan relied on in Gaza and may work in the short term. However, success is unlikely in the long run.
The June 5 report confirmed that Israel has been armed and apparently supported or worked with armed militias in Gaza. Some reports call the group a “gang.” Other reports describe the group’s leader, Yasser Abu Shabab, a member of a large clan in southern Gaza. There may be more clans to be activated or encouraged than Yasser Abu Shabab. Shabab is not his real name, his name is Nomme de Guerre, which means that full details about the group continue to be shrouded in a mystery.
Since the details are shrouded in some fog, it is difficult to know whether these groups will become effective anti-Hamas movements. If these groups were more famous for robbing and committing crimes in the past, rather than achieving too much, then the average person might not accept them. If these groups were made up of men with clans and even Bedouin tribes, it would be difficult for them to break into other Gazans. It is worth mentioning whether the new militia in Gaza is effective and whether history tells us that armed militia is an effective strategy.
First, let’s see what we know about Gaza. It is worth noting that the population of Gaza is divided into different groups. In 1949, some people came to Gaza as refugees and fled the Negev area and became part of Israel. These people may make up more than half of Gaza’s population. The people of Gaza then trace their legacy back to those who lived in Gaza for hundreds of years before 1948. These people can be called primitive Gaza people. They are very different from the so-called “refugees”.
The refugees moved to camps such as Khan Yunis, Rafa, Maghazi, Dil Albala, Jabalya, Nisirat and Shati. These camps became the backbone of the Palestinian political and armed movement. They also became a hotbed of Hamas activities in the 1980s and 1990s and therefore a hotbed of terrorism. Gaza people, who were earlier than 1948, were less inclined to Hamas.
Illustration of a drone hovering Hamas terrorist. (Image source: Abed Rahim Khatib/Flash90, Yuri Coretz/AFP, Pixelfit signed by Getty Images)
Will militia be accepted by Palestinian society?
This means that any attempt by armed militia, gang or clan will face obstacles in penetrating Gaza society. This is because groups that are rooted in one area, may not be popular in other areas, or may even alienate people. As early as the 1980s, families and clans in Gaza were often involved in violence with each other. This kind of domestic violence is also common in Arab villages in Israel, where gun violence has been around in recent years. This violence means people are often divided and it is difficult to unify them in military or political terms.
History tells us about the challenges the army or state faces in recruiting or arming tribes, mercenaries, militias or other types of paramilitary groups? In ancient times, it was not uncommon for tribes to act as auxiliary institutions together with normal military forms. Furthermore, it is very common that when countries participate in wars, they often bring in cavalry of smaller allies. For example, when Hannibal fought against Rome, he had to recruit people from Italy, because the actual number in his army began to decline over time.
By the 15th and 16th centuries, mercenaries played an important role in the battles of Italian city-states. It was the Machiavelli era [and] undisciplined. “But, in the Revolutionary War, charities that employ mercenaries and others have not proven to be effective. For example, the contingent includes tribes that once fought against Henan Cortes.
In the modern era, many countries try to cooperate with tribes and militias. Lawrence of Arabia, for example, cooperated with tribes against the Ottoman Empire. During the Vietnam War, the United States often cooperated with Montagnad fighters who opposed the Communist Party. The United States also cooperates with the Miao people in Laos. Later, during the U.S. occupation of Iraq, the United States relied on a man named Son of Iraq or Sahvi, a Sunni tribal militia. These are concentrated in Anbar province. Rwanda has long-standing support groups in eastern Congo, which are composed of members of the Tutsi minority.
This history tells us that there is a long tradition with tribal militias, clans, gangs or mercenaries. However, historically, these groups have no lasting ability to achieve results. Often, they are used as part of policy and then usually abandoned at the end of the war. In other cases, they just disappeared. For example, Iraq’s Sunni “Awakening” group starved to death after the United States left Iraq in 2011. Some tribes supporting the United States continue to play a role. During the ISIS invasion of Iraq, many tribes near Christmas helped to stop the ISIS attack. These include the Jughayfa tribe and the Albu Nimr tribe. ISIS persecuted the resisting tribal groups. Major Sunni tribes and similar extremists such as Shammar opposes ISIS. However, most of these tribes cannot operate at the national level and they can only help ensure certain areas.
The use of tribes and militias usually enables the states to stand out among the states they are intervening. When borders or weak countries are in chaos, countries often seek to arm local groups to help protect their borders. This could backfire because these groups could end up rampaging and squeezing people, or they could rise in wars in neighboring countries. For example, the Vietnam War destroyed the stability of Cambodia and Laos, which led to great suffering over the years. Minorities exploited as ally are often betrayed. In other cases, states will try to choose and even work with drug cartels, which is how Mexico’s former PRI seemed to operate in the country in the 1980s and 1990s. When the country is trapped in a cycle of brutal violence, the cartels are stronger than some state governments.
Tribal militia or clan relied on in Gaza and may work in the short term. However, success is unlikely in the long run. The theory that the lives of Israeli soldiers will be saved through this alliance is not necessarily proven by history. Often, when states think they can provide guns for tribes or militias as short-term solutions, they later find that they are attracted to more complex wars. For example, the spillover of the Rwandan genocide has caused the battle in eastern Congo for 30 years. Will the use of agents and tribal and militia there be helpful for Rwanda or Congo or anyone else in the long run? Probably not. The same can be said for Sudan, Libya, Yemen, Somalia or many other states about failure and civil war. In the long run, a protracted civil war in Gaza could hurt Israel.
