President Xi Jinping is believed to order his armed forces to prepare for invasion of Taiwan between 2027 and 2027, and, if necessary, in the next few years, the ghosts of catastrophic military conflict will almost inevitably attract in the United States.
However, Mr. Xi Jinping's continued clearance of his top military rankings has brought doubts about that deadline, and in the long run, whether he could believe his general successfully launched the war.
Over the past two years, two defense ministers and many senior PLA officials have evacuated from their posts, including senior leaders of the Rocket Force that controls China's nuclear weapons.
According to recent reports, including one of the highest deporters to date: General He Weidong, the country's second official, continued to roll, including reporting directly to Mr XI and has been planning a theoretical Taiwan invasion.
It is impossible to determine whether such dismissal is related to corruption (a stubborn and serious problem in the People's Liberation Army) is related to ideological differences or other reasons. But the commotion raised serious questions about the capabilities and reliability of Xi Jinping's military commander. This will likely weaken his interest in war, thus providing time for Taiwan and the United States to strengthen their defense capabilities.
There is no doubt that the Chinese army has come a long way. Once outdated, it is the world's largest armed force and competes with the US air, navy and missiles. For years, Chinese troops have been rehearsing Taiwan’s invasion or blockade (including exercises in early April) and have laid out some challenges to transport thousands of troops across the Taiwan Strait.
However, hardware and logistics alone do not guarantee victory. Military performance depends largely on the leadership of the battlefield – experienced commanders are able to make quick calls in the fog of war. China has not fought since 1979. Today's Chinese officers are different from those of the United States and Russia and have no battlefield experience. This fact is something Xi Jinping himself lamented.
Deeper issues – internal turmoil stressed – Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party may even have no solid control over their military.
Unlike the American soldiers who take the oath of the Constitution and should be politically unpolitical, the People's Liberation Army is the army of the Communist Party of China. Its officials vowed allegiance to them as members of the party and ordered the party leader and its powerful chairman of the Central Military Commission from Mr. XI. In theory, they should be firmly controlled by the party, but that is not the case.
The People's Liberation Army and its joint forces, the Navy and the Air Force occupy a strong position in China. This is immortal for Mao Zedong, who said: “Political power develops from the barrel of a gun.” The status of the army led to the party leaders granting it a high degree of autonomy to ensure that the general remains loyal and essentially allow it to be self-governed.
Over the years, China's military spending has soared, as has the opportunity for corruption. Party leaders, some of whom themselves are accused of corruption, often look at another way. But after Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, he launched an anti-corruption campaign throughout the party, rooted in senior military officers who were corrupt or possibly unfaithful. Since Mao Zedong, he has also carried out the largest reorganization of the armed forces.
The long-running purge shows that he is still working to advocate control.
Most recent firings seem to be related to corruption. But, like his predecessor, Xi Jinping needs the support of the military to maintain his power and can only go too far in attacking his grafted culture. It illustrates the trickyness of the problem, and the person who has been his own appointment for the past two years.
Corruption weakens military preparations in important ways. It can fuel the rise of officials leading kickbacks and lead to under-purchasing equipment compared to commanding the troops. A report released by the U.S. Department of Defense last year showed that corruption in Chinese rocket forces could be so severe that some missile silos need repairs.
Perhaps more importantly, the wave of dismissals may mean that Xi Jinping cannot fully believe that his military advisers have told him about China's preparations for the war. Especially in his case, he raised doubts about Taiwan’s case, which is China’s claim to be a self-ruling island in its own territory. As a former head of the Eastern Theater Command, he will be responsible for planning a potential invasion of Taiwan until Xi Jinping promoted him to vice chairman of the Military Commission in 2022, where he was the top adviser to Chinese leaders in the Taiwan movement.
All of this adds another key issue common on the continent of authoritarian countries: political intervention. Chinese officers and soldiers spent a lot of time on political indoctrination, including studying Xi Jinping's speech. The ever-present political committee ensures that the party’s orders are followed, which can slow down decision-making and curb individual initiative. In a democracy, by contrast, officers have more freedom to make their own decisions and learn from their mistakes.
None of this means that Taipei or Washington has the ability to be complacent. Even if it is not fully prepared, China's huge army will fight, especially if China believes Taiwan is moving towards a complete independence.
But Mr. Xi Jinping may not ruin the battle. Russian President Vladimir Putin's disastrous invasion of Ukraine shows the world that military alone will not ensure the defeat and identify smaller enemies. Victory or failure, the war with Taiwan could destroy China's economy – already facing a slowdown in growth and a slowdown in U.S. trade tariffs – a military failure could threaten Xi Jinping's power.
Taiwan should use this time to fundamentally increase spending on weapons that are particularly useful for repelling invasions, such as anti-ship cruise missiles, submarine and drones. The United States should deploy more long-range missiles and other weapons to the region to stop Chinese attacks on the islands. It can also leverage U.S. military creativity by designing innovative ways to thwart Chinese commanders’ inexperience and inability to quickly respond to unforeseen circumstances.
The biggest risk today is that fear and tension caused by aggressive Chinese behavior and language lead to miscalculation and war. China's threat will continue. However, leaders in Taiwan and the United States must avoid overreacting and recognize that Mr. XI will be reluctant to be sent to combat by scandalized military forces for the foreseeable future.
Phillip C. Saunders is director of the Center Center of the National Institute of Strategic Studies, Washington National Defense University. They are the author of “China seeks military supremacy.”
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