Targeting nuclear scientists was once a covert operation. Israel just opens it

It is believed that at least 14 nuclear scientists were among the people killed in the Israeli operation launched on June 13, 2025, ostensibly to destroy or devalue Iran’s nuclear program and military capabilities.

Deliberately targeting scientists in this way, aiming to undermine Iran’s knowledge base and continuity in nuclear expertise. Those assassinated include Mohammad Mehdi Tehranchi, a theoretical physicist and president of the Islamic Azad University in Iran, and Fereydoun Abbasi-Davani, a nuclear engineer who leads the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization.

Overall, these physics and engineering experts are potential successors to Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, widely regarded as the architect of Iran’s nuclear program, who was assassinated in a November 2020 attack, with many blaming Israel.

As two political scientists writing a book about the state’s targeting scientists as anti-proliferation tools, we understand well that nuclear scientists have been targeted since the beginning of the nuclear era. We collected data on nearly 100 instances from 1944 to 2025.

The latest assassination campaign against Iranian scientists is different from many early plots, but there are several key ways. Israel’s recent attacks targeted multiple nuclear experts and simultaneously carried out military forces to destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities, air defense and energy infrastructure. Similarly, unlike previous secret operations, Israel immediately claimed responsibility for the assassination.

But our research shows that targeting scientists may be effective against anti-diffusion. While the removal of personal expertise may delay nuclear acquisition capabilities, targeting the target alone is unlikely to completely destroy the plan and may even increase a country’s desire for nuclear weapons. In addition, targeting scientists may trigger a counterattack because of the concerns about legitimacy and morality.

A long history policy

The goal for nuclear scientists began during World War II, when Allied forces and Soviet troops ran for Nazi scientists, reducing Adolf Hitler’s ability to build nuclear bombs and use his expertise to advance U.S. and Soviet nuclear programs.

In our dataset, we classify “localization” as cases where scientists are captured, threatened, injured or killed as countries try to prevent adversaries from obtaining weapons of mass destruction. Over time, at least four countries targeted scientists engaged in nine national nuclear programs.

The United States and Israel allegedly carried out the most attacks on nuclear scientists. But Britain and the Soviet Union have also been behind such attacks.

Meanwhile, scientists working for the nuclear program in Egypt, Iran and Iraq have been the most common target since 1950. Since 2007, 10 scientists involved in Iran’s nuclear program have been killed in the attack ahead of Israel’s current operations. Nationals from other countries also became targets: In 1980, Mossad, the Israeli Intelligence Agency, allegedly bombed the house of Italian engineer Mario Fiorelli and his company Snia Techint to warn Europeans involved in the Iraqi nuclear project.

Given this history, the fact that Israel’s nuclear program attacks Iran is not surprising in itself. Indeed, this is the Israeli Prime Minister’s continuous strategic goal to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, and experts have been warning that since mid-2024, the possibility of Israeli military operations has increased due to regional dynamics and Iran’s nuclear development.

By then, the balance of power in the Middle East had undergone a huge change. Israel systematically lowered the leadership and infrastructure of Iranian agents Hamas and Hezbollah. Later, it destroyed Iranian air defense near Tehran, nearly nuclear facilities. The subsequent collapse of the Assad regime in Syria has given another long-standing ally in Tehran. These developments combined have greatly weakened Iran, made it vulnerable to external attacks and deprived the once harsh proxy network, which is expected to retaliate on its behalf in the event of hostilities.

Iranian leaders have weakened traditional military capabilities with their agent’s “axis of resistance” and may think that expanding its abundance is the best choice for their future.

In the months after Israel’s recent attacks, Iran has expanded its nuclear production capacity to surpass 60% uranium enrichment, a technical step in weapons-grade materials. During Donald Trump’s first term, the president pulled out of the United States from a multilateral non-proliferation agreement aimed at curbing Iran’s nuclear program. After re-election, Trump appears to have changed the struggle by engaging in new diplomatic ways with Iran, but so far these negotiations have failed to reach a deal and may be shelved in the war for the foreseeable future.

Recently, the International Atomic Energy Agency committee declared that Iran did not comply with its nuclear uncertainty obligations. In response, Iran announced that its enrichment capabilities will be further expanded by adding advanced centrifugation technology and a third enrichment site.

Even if the international community expects a wider attack on Iran, the characteristics of the target itself are surprising. Historically, states have secretly targeted individual scientists. But the recent multiscientist attacks have taken place publicly, and Israel takes responsibility, publicly stating the purpose of the attack. Furthermore, while a country’s use of multiple anti-proliferation tools over time is nothing new to its opponents, Israel is atypical to target scientists using both preventive military forces and once again targeting infrastructure.

Furthermore, such attacks on scientists are historically low technology and low cost, and death or injury is caused by gunmen, car bombs or accidents. In fact, Abasi, who was killed in the recent attack, survived a car bombing in Tehran. However, there are outliers including the assassination of Fakhrizadeh, in which a distant machine gun smuggled into Iranian territory.

Israel’s pursuit of scientists’ logic

Why target nuclear scientists?

In foreign policy, there are many tools if one state is designed to prevent another from obtaining nuclear weapons. In addition to targeting scientists, there are sanctions, diplomacy, cyberattacks and military forces.

Targeting scientists may eliminate key scientific expertise and impose costs to increase the difficulty of building nuclear weapons. Supporters believe targeting these experts could undermine the country’s efforts, prevent it from continuing nuclear development, and send others the danger of supporting nuclear proliferation.

Therefore, countries targeting scientists believe that doing so is an effective way to reduce adversary nuclear programs. Indeed, the IDF described the recent attack as a “major blow to the regime’s ability to acquire weapons of mass destruction.”

Although Israel focuses on scientists as a source of critical knowledge, there may be thousands of work within Iran to question the efficacy of targeting. In addition, there are legal, moral and moral issues for scientists.

Furthermore, it is a risky option that may not undermine the enemy’s nuclear program while sparking public anger and calling for revenge. This is especially true if scientists who are often regarded as civilians are called martyrs.

Therefore, targeting the campaign may strengthen domestic support for the government, which may redouble its efforts for nuclear development.

Regardless of whether targeting scientists is an effective anti-proliferation tool, it has been around since the beginning of the nuclear era – for states designed to prevent proliferation, it may continue to be part of a foreign policy toolkit. In the current conflict with Iran and its targeting of nuclear scientists, we hope this strategy will continue in the war and elsewhere.

Jenna Jordan, associate professor of international affairs at Georgia Tech, and Rachel Whitlark, associate professor of international affairs at Georgia Tech. This article is republished from the conversation under the Creative Sharing License. Read the original article.